Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) ss 32, 44, 84A, 49, 90

Disputes and industrial action. Conferences, orders and the Full Bench.

A WA state union's everyday tool is the s 44 compulsory conference. The same power is how employers stop industrial action: the IR Act has no ballots and no protected action, so action is controlled case by case through Commission orders and their enforcement.

No ballotand no protected action: the IR Act neither requires a ballot nor gives immunity ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [75])
$13,000the most the Full Bench can impose for each contravention of a Commission order (s 84A(5))
21 daysto appeal to the Full Bench, or from it to the Industrial Appeal Court (ss 49(3), 90(2))
A line drawing of a union official and an employer's representative sitting at a small conference table across from a commissioner, with folders open and a jug of water between them

Words used on this page:

  1. industrial action is any act, omission or circumstance by an organisation, employer, employee or other person for the purpose, or in the Commission's opinion for the purpose, of compelling an employer, employee or organisation to accept terms or conditions of employment or to comply with a demand relating to employment. An application under the Act is never industrial action (s 7);
  2. an industrial matter is any matter affecting or relating to work, privileges, rights or duties of employers or employees, which the s 7 definition spells out at length, including wages, hours, conditions, union rights and the dismissal of or refusal to employ any person;
  3. a finding is a decision made in the course of proceedings that does not finally decide the matter, such as an interim order at a conference (s 7).

Section numbers on this page are of the IR Act unless another Act is named.

Key time limits

StepTimeSource
Appeal to the Full Bench from a commissioner's decisionWithin 21 days of the date of the decision (the order, not the reasons)IR Act s 49(3)
Appeal bookWithin 14 days of filing the notice of appealCommission Regulations reg 102(10)
Appeal to the Industrial Appeal CourtWithin 21 days of the decision. The Court has no power to extend its 90(2); Saldanha [2009] WASCA 119 at [5]
Application to the Full Bench to enforce an order (s 84A)Within 6 years after the contraventions 82A
An oral order made at a conferenceMust be reduced to writing and made available to the parties bounds 44(12d)
A dismissed member's own unfair dismissal referralNo later than 28 days after the employment ends; later only if it would be unfair not to accept its 29(2)(a), (3)
Appeal to the Full Bench from a commissioner's decisionTime: Within 21 days of the date of the decision (the order, not the reasons)
Source
IR Act s 49(3)
Appeal bookTime: Within 14 days of filing the notice of appeal
Source
Commission Regulations reg 102(10)
Appeal to the Industrial Appeal CourtTime: Within 21 days of the decision. The Court has no power to extend it
Source
s 90(2); Saldanha [2009] WASCA 119 at [5]
Application to the Full Bench to enforce an order (s 84A)Time: Within 6 years after the contravention
Source
s 82A
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An oral order made at a conferenceTime: Must be reduced to writing and made available to the parties bound
Source
s 44(12d)
A dismissed member's own unfair dismissal referralTime: No later than 28 days after the employment ends; later only if it would be unfair not to accept it
Source
s 29(2)(a), (3)

The short version

  1. A union may ask the Commission for a compulsory conference about any industrial matter for its members (s 44(7)). An individual employee may do so only about their own long service leave.
  2. At the conference the Commission conciliates, and may make interim orders to prevent industrial relations deteriorating or to help resolve the matter (s 44(6)(ba)). If there is no agreement, it may arbitrate (s 44(9)).
  3. Those orders bind only the parties to the conference (s 44(6a)). An order cannot bind a union's members, but can require the union to inform and direct them.
  4. The IR Act has no protected action, no ballot and no immunity. Nor does it ban industrial action: action is controlled by Commission orders ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [75]).
  5. Breaching an order is enforced before the Full Bench under s 84A, by penalties of up to $13,000 for each contravention, or a summons to show cause why the union's registration should not be cancelled or suspended.
  6. Appeals go to the Full Bench within 21 days, and from it to the Industrial Appeal Court on three narrow grounds only (ss 49, 90).

General information, not legal advice.

Compulsory conferences (s 44)

Section 44 gives a union standing an individual does not have. An individual employee may summon an employer to a s 44 conference only about their own long service leave (Waterton v Director General, Department of Education [2023] WAIRC 00302 at [48], [57]-[64]).

Who may apply, and about what

An application may be made by (s 44(7)):

  1. any organisation, association or employer;
  2. the Minister on behalf of the State; or
  3. a person about their own long service leave entitlement.

The Commission may also call a conference of its own motion whenever industrial action has happened or, in its opinion, is likely (s 44(7)). The subject can be any industrial matter (s 7).

Some subjects are excluded. The Commission must not regulate suspension, discipline, dismissal or reinstatement where another Act provides for the matter with a right of appeal (s 23(3)(d)), and stop bullying and sexual harassment matters have their own routes (ss 51BK(2), 51BV(2)). How these limits apply to members' discipline and dismissal is covered in Members and their claims and The WA public sector.

The application and the summons
  1. The application is in the approved form, Form 1B, and sets out why the conference is sought; no response need be filed (Commission Regulations reg 30(1)-(2)). Form 1B asks for the urgency, the background, the steps taken to resolve the dispute, the issues remaining and the outcome sought, including any interim orders.
  2. The Commission may summon a person by any means, including orally, by telephone or by email (reg 30(3)). A summons given in the prescribed way is taken to have been served unless the person proves otherwise (s 44(2)).
  3. A person summoned must attend and keep attending as directed, unless they prove good cause (s 44(3)). Failure is enforceable before the Full Bench: a union secretary who ignored a summons in the 2022 nurses' dispute was ordered to pay $10,000 (Registrar v Reah; ANF [2023] WAIRC 00299 at [178]).
At the conference: the Commission's powers
  1. Private. A s 44 conference is held in private unless the Commission thinks the Act's objects are better served in public (s 44(5)), and it may direct that disclosure of what was discussed be limited (s 44(6)(b)).
  2. Conciliation first. The Commission must do all things that appear right and proper to help the parties agree (s 44(5a)), and may direct them to confer (s 44(6)(a)).
  3. Interim orders. It may make orders which in its opinion will (s 44(6)(ba)):
    1. prevent the deterioration of industrial relations in the matter until conciliation or arbitration has resolved it;
    2. enable conciliation or arbitration to resolve it; or
    3. encourage the parties to exchange attitudes or information.
  4. Other orders. It may make any order or declaration it is otherwise authorised to make and, in a claim of harsh, oppressive or unfair dismissal, any interim order it thinks appropriate until the claim is resolved (s 44(6)(bb)).
  5. In writing. An oral order must be reduced to writing and made available to the parties bound (s 44(12d)).

These are the orders a union seeks to hold the status quo against a restructure, roster change or transfer made without consultation, and the orders an employer seeks against industrial action. In a bargaining dispute the "matter in question" is the bargaining as a whole, not only the immediate directive (SSTU v Director-General, Department of Education and Training [2008] WAIRC 00364 at [37]).

Who the orders bind

An order under s 44(6)(ba) or (bb) binds only the parties to the conference, and may vary an award or industrial agreement as between them (s 44(6a)). A union's members are not parties. An order that purports to bind them is beyond power to that extent (LHMU v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2010] WAIRC 00849 at [65]-[66]; [2008] WAIRC 00364 at [87], [98]). An order can still require the union to inform its members and direct them to comply.

A fair hearing

The union must have a fair opportunity to answer an application for orders. Urgency can reduce what fairness requires only if it is shown to need that. A 10-minute adjournment to read 132 pages of submissions and witness statements was a denial of procedural fairness ([2010] WAIRC 00849 at [37], [51]-[55]). See the case study below.

After the conference
  1. Agreement. The Commission may make an order in the agreed terms binding the parties who consent, or record a memorandum (s 44(8)).
  2. No agreement. The Commission may hear and determine the question and make an order binding the parties concerned (s 44(9)). A memorandum of the matters for hearing is drawn up (reg 31). The commissioner who presided may hear the arbitration, but must say so at the end of the conference, and if a party objects, only after a direction from the Chief Commissioner (s 44(10)-(12)).
  3. Consent to a final decision. If all the parties still in dispute consent in writing, the presiding commissioner may decide the question conclusively; no appeal lies (s 44(12a), (12c)).
  4. Operation. Section 39, on when an award operates and the limits on backdating, applies to s 44 orders (s 44(13)).
Section 32 conciliation

Outside s 44, any industrial matter referred to the Commission must be conciliated unless that would not help (s 32(1)). The Commission may make the same kinds of interim orders (s 32(8)), and must preface them with a written preamble (s 32(4)).

The limit: the Commission arbitrates, it does not enforce

  1. Section 44 powers create future rights. They do not let the Commission enforce an instrument or simply declare what it means (AMA (WA) v Child and Adolescent Health Service [2022] WAIRC 00763 at [3], [7]). The Commission starts by working out the essential nature of the proceeding, beginning with the relief sought (at [2], [5]).
  2. It may interpret an award or agreement on the way to deciding a dispute, but not "engage in bare interpretation, or purport to make binding declarations of right, or purport to enforce the instrument" (City of Stirling v WASU [2025] WAIRC 00797 at [27]).
  3. In that case the Full Bench held that deciding whether a redeployment role was suitable alternative employment under an agreement required interpreting the clause as a step along the way, which was within power; but a question whether the employee was owed a redundancy payment because of past events sought a declaration of existing rights and was beyond power (at [47], [49]-[53]). The appeal from WASU v City of Stirling [2024] WAIRC 00803 was upheld in part, and the suitability question was sent back to be decided again (at [45], [57]).
  4. So frame s 44 relief as what should happen now and in future: reinstate, redeploy, restore a roster, consult before implementing. Recovering money already owed is enforcement in the Industrial Magistrates Court, and a general declaration of meaning is an application under s 46; see Members and their claims and Awards and orders.

Industrial action in the state system

The IR Act has no protected action regime. It requires no ballot and no notice, and gives no immunity. Nor does it ban action: "The Act does not provide for any ban upon an organisation or its members engaging in a stop work meeting apart from when ordered by the Commission" ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [75]). Action is controlled case by case, through Commission orders and their enforcement. As a member of the Full Bench put it, "bargaining is not without rules. The Commission retains the power to decide whether particular industrial action should be permitted to occur, particularly having regard for the public interest" (Registrar v SSTU [2008] WAIRC 00270 at [155]).

The s 7 definition covers strikes, stop work meetings, and bans and limitations. It does not name lock-outs, but an employer's act to compel employees to accept terms falls within its words.

Action and good faith bargaining

The Commission may decide, having regard to the circumstances, that industrial action is a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith (s 42B(3)), so it is not necessarily one ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [75]). The timing of action against the state of talks matters: the Acting President counted it as relevant that the stoppage was set for the middle of a short period in which the employer was going to consider putting a new offer (at [32], [63]). A union that says the employer is bargaining in bad faith is expected to seek orders under Division 2B rather than take action ([2008] WAIRC 00270 at [156]-[157]). See Industrial agreements and bargaining.

Orders to stop action
  1. The route. The employer, or the Minister, files a s 44 application; the Commission may also act of its own motion (s 44(7)). It may then make orders to prevent industrial relations deteriorating (s 44(6)(ba)), and orders under s 42E to ensure good faith bargaining. Similar orders can be made under s 32(8).
  2. How wide. In bargaining, an order may cover future stop work meetings in that bargaining, not only the one announced ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [37]). An order banning one form of action for the period of negotiations was held not to be too broad (at [140]).
  3. Whom it binds. Only the union, not its members (s 44(6a)). A registered union is a body corporate, separate from its officers, employees and members (s 60(1); [2008] WAIRC 00364 at [85]-[87]). An order against "the union, its officers, agents, employees and members" is varied to bind the union "by" its officers, agents and employees (at [98]).
  4. What else orders have required. In reported cases, orders have required the union to lift directives, to tell members about the order by stated means (email, website, Facebook, notice boards), and not to encourage or fund the action ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [9]; [2023] WAIRC 00299 at [15]).
Challenging an order
  1. An order made at a s 44 conference is usually a finding, so an appeal lies only if the Full Bench thinks the matter so important that, in the public interest, an appeal should lie (s 49(2a)). The 2008 appeal cleared that bar because it raised questions about the Commission's power over unions ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [16]), and the 2010 appeal because it raised questions about procedural fairness at s 44 conferences ([2010] WAIRC 00849 at [67]-[68]).
  2. Lodging an appeal does not stop the order operating. A stay can be sought from the Full Bench's presiding commissioner (s 49(11)).
  3. Orders usually reserve liberty to apply, which is the quicker way to have them varied.
  4. Until it is varied, revoked or stayed, the order must be obeyed. "To simply defy it was irresponsible" ([2008] WAIRC 00270 at [158]).

Enforcement before the Full Bench (s 84A)

Who brings it
  1. A breach of a s 32 or s 44 order or direction, or of a s 44(3) summons, is enforced on application by the Registrar at the Commission's direction (s 84A(1)(b)).
  2. A breach of other provisions of the Act may be enforced by the Minister, the Registrar, an inspector, or an organisation, association or employer with a sufficient interest (s 84A(1)(a)). That excludes ss 42B(1), 44(3) and 74, civil penalty provisions and offences (s 84A(1)(a), (3)).
  3. The Full Bench's jurisdiction is exclusive (s 82; [2023] WAIRC 00299 at [65]). The application is on Form 1 (Commission Regulations reg 60), and must be made within 6 years (s 82A).
How the Full Bench approaches it
  1. Its purpose is like contempt: not only to make the party comply, but to uphold the requirement to obey the Commission and to sanction those who do not ([2008] WAIRC 00270 at [70]-[76]).
  2. Before a hearing the Full Bench must invite the parties to confer with it, unless that would be pointless (s 84A(4)(b)). The civil standard of proof applies (s 84A(8)).
  3. It must have regard to the seriousness of the contravention, any undertakings about future conduct, and any mitigating circumstances (s 84A(4)(a)). Seriousness looks at the kind of order and why it was made, whether the breach was deliberate, any other breaches, and the consequences; mitigation includes an apology, no prior record, admissions and stopping the conduct ([2008] WAIRC 00270 at [81]-[83], [87]).
What it can do

If the contravention is proved, the Full Bench may (s 84A(5)):

  1. accept an undertaking;
  2. issue a caution;
  3. impose a penalty of up to $13,000 (it was $10,000 for contraventions in 2022, and $2,000 in 2008: [2023] WAIRC 00299 at [65]; [2008] WAIRC 00270 at [165]); or
  4. direct the Registrar to issue a summons under s 73(1) to show cause why the union's registration should not be cancelled or suspended.

Each separately identifiable contravention attracts the maximum, and the course of conduct and totality principles are then applied. In the 2022 nurses' case each of 1,808 members' walk-offs was treated as a separate contravention of the no-strike order, and the Full Bench then viewed them together as one course of conduct in setting the penalty ([2023] WAIRC 00299 at [145], [173]-[175]). Costs for lawyers or agents are awarded only if the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious (s 84A(6)).

Documents

In the 2023 proceedings the union first objected to discovery on the ground of penalty privilege, but its counsel conceded that the privilege does not extend to corporations, which include a registered union (Registrar v Reah [2023] WAIRC 00083 at [12]).

Other legal exposure

Boycotts over union membership (s 96E)

A person, including a union, must not take or threaten industrial action against an employer intending to coerce it to take "discriminatory action" against a second person because that person or a third person is not a union member, or to coerce the employer to join a union (s 96E(3)). "Discriminatory action" means refusing to use a person's services, refusing to receive goods the person offers, or refusing to supply goods or services to them (s 96E(4)): the provision targets action to make an employer boycott a non-union supplier, contractor or customer.

It is an offence. The fine is $400 to $5,000 for an individual, and otherwise $1,000 to $10,000 plus $500 a day while it continues (s 96E(3)). The minimums cannot be reduced, and an organisation that does not pay at once has its rights under the Act suspended until it does (s 96F(1)-(2)).

No further claims clauses

Whether industrial action in support of a claim during an agreement's term breaches a no further claims undertaking depends on the clause's words; many are framed only as an undertaking not to make further claims. No WA decision deciding that question for an industrial agreement has been found. A breach has been enforced where it took the form of a s 44 application (Director General, Department of Justice v CSA [2025] WAIRC 00146 at [89]). In the 2022 nurses' dispute the Commission's own order restrained public statements that the union was holding out for a better offer, and the strike was charged as a breach of a separate no-strike order ([2023] WAIRC 00299 at [8], [10], [175]).

Members' pay

Nothing in the IR Act protects members from the ordinary contractual consequences of not working, and the IR Act has no counterpart to the Fair Work Act's strike pay rules.

  1. The Full Bench has applied the common law rule that an employer need not pay for a period in which no service was given, in a case that was not about industrial action (Director General, Department of Justice v CSA [2003] WAIRC 07994 at [29], [31]-[32], [52]-[53], [70], [87]-[88]). One member cautioned that the rule needs care for public servants, who hold office for an indefinite period (at [90]).
  2. In 1991, in an arbitration about a stoppage with "an element of protest", the Commission held that a refusal to perform duties, unless justified on safety grounds, entitled the employer to stop paying wages for the period of refusal (Western Australian Meat Commission v AMIEU [1991] WAIRC 10490).
  3. Under the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA), an employee is entitled to be paid in full, and deductions need written authority, an industrial instrument or contract term, or a court order or law (MCE Act ss 17C(1), 17D(1)). No WA decision has been found on whether withholding or recovering pay for industrial action, or for partial work bans, is a "deduction" under s 17D. Check the award or agreement, which may deal with it.
Court action against the union

A registered union is a body corporate for the purposes of the IR Act and "may sue and be sued" (s 60(1)-(2)). The IR Act gives no immunity for industrial action, so a state union can be sued in tort and restrained by injunction in the Supreme Court. In 2005 the Supreme Court granted interlocutory injunctions against a WA registered union and others over strikes on a construction site, finding a serious question to be tried on claims of interference with contractual relations and unlawful interference with business (John Holland Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2005] WASC 146 at [3], [17], [69], [82], [86]). Commission proceedings were relevant to the balance of convenience but were not a reason to refuse relief there (at [84]-[85]). No trial or appeal decision in WA on a state union's liability in tort for industrial action has been found.

Secondary boycotts

The secondary boycott provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) reach state unions and state-system action:

  1. s 45D binds "a person" acting in concert with another; its reach turns on whether the target is a corporation, not on the workers' industrial system (CCA s 45D(3)-(4));
  2. an "organisation of employees" is defined by what it does, furthering its members' interests in their employment, not by federal registration (s 4(1));
  3. the exception for conduct authorised by a State Act needs a provision that expressly refers to the CCA (s 51(1C)(a)), and the IR Act has none; and
  4. in 2006 the Federal Court, on admissions and by consent, declared that a WA registered union had contravened s 45D of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the CCA's former name, by hindering supplies to a Perth construction site, and ordered a $50,000 penalty (ACCC v CFMEU [2006] FCA 1730).

The Fair Work Act immunity for protected action cannot help, because state-system action is never protected action under that Act.

Appeals

To the Full Bench (s 49)
  1. From what. Any decision of a single commissioner (s 49(1)-(2)). The decision is the order, not the reasons ([2025] WAIRC 00797 at [58]). An appeal from a finding needs the Full Bench's opinion that the public interest requires it (s 49(2a); WALGA v WASU [2024] WAIRC 00391 at [26]-[28]), and the notice must say why (Commission Regulations reg 102(4)). "Permission to appeal" is a Fair Work concept, not part of s 49 (Molinari v Director General, DBCA [2025] WAIRC 00986 at [6]).
  2. No appeal at all from a s 42G order (s 42G(6)), a s 42H declaration (s 42H(2)) or a determination made by consent under s 44(12a) (s 44(12c)).
  3. Who and when. A party, or an intervener who gets leave at the hearing, within 21 days of the decision (s 49(3), (4)(b)). The notice is Form 8, with grounds stated clearly and the decision sought (reg 102(1)-(3)).
  4. Late appeals. The Full Bench may extend time to do justice between the parties, looking at the length of and reasons for the delay, the prospects of success and prejudice (Jacobs v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00353 at [13]-[16]).
  5. The hearing. On the evidence and matters raised below (s 49(4)(a)). It is a rehearing, so the appellant must show error (Fagan v Minister for Corrective Services [2024] WASCA 167 at [58]-[59], published by the WAIRC as [2025] WAIRC 00014). On the construction of an instrument the Full Bench decides the meaning for itself ([2025] WAIRC 00797 at [14]-[15]).
  6. Outcome. Dismiss, uphold and quash or vary, or remit, but remit only if the Full Bench cannot decide the merits itself (s 49(5)-(6a)).
To the Industrial Appeal Court (s 90)

An appeal lies from the Full Bench, the Commission in Court Session, or a stay decision under s 49(11), on three grounds only (s 90(1)):

  1. the decision is in excess of jurisdiction because the matter is not an industrial matter;
  2. the decision is wrong in law because of an error in construing an Act, regulation, award, industrial agreement or order; or
  3. the appellant was denied the right to be heard.

The construction ground is narrow: applying correctly understood law to the facts is not enough, and the error must have materially affected the decision (Palaloi v Director General, Department of Education [2025] WASCA 130 at [24]-[25], [34]). The appeal must be filed within 21 days (s 90(2)), and the Court has no power to extend that time (Saldanha v Fujitsu Australia Ltd [2009] WASCA 119 at [5]; United Voice WA v Director General, Department of Education [2014] WAIRC 01361 at [25]-[27]). If a ground is made out but no injustice was suffered, the Court must confirm the decision unless there is good reason not to (s 90(3a)).

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Decided cases

What the Commission and the courts decided.

Published decisions, retold in plain English from the decision itself. Each links to the full text. Lawcaptain did not act in these cases.

Appeal allowed in partWestern Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Full Bench (Acting President Ritter, Chief Commissioner Beech, Senior Commissioner Smith) · 17 June 2008

An order stopping a teachers' meeting could bind the union, but not its members

During bargaining for a new teachers' agreement, the union called a statewide stop work meeting. At a conference a few days later, the Commission ordered the union, its officers and its members not to hold that meeting or any other stop work meeting while negotiations went on.

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Result. Appeal allowed (for the union) on one ground only: the order was varied so that it bound the union, acting by its officers, agents and employees, and not its members. The ban on further stop work meetings during the bargaining otherwise stood.

The employer applied for a s 44 conference after the union directed members to stop work on a Thursday morning, while weekly negotiations were continuing ([2]). The Commissioner ordered that the union, "its officers, agents, employees and members" lift the directive, and that no further stop work meetings be held about the negotiations while the order was in force ([9]).

On appeal, the Full Bench held that the "matter in question" was the bargaining as a whole, not just the one meeting, so the order could reach future stop work meetings in that bargaining ([37]). Industrial action is not necessarily a breach of good faith, and "The Act does not provide for any ban upon an organisation or its members engaging in a stop work meeting apart from when ordered by the Commission" ([75]).

But a registered union is a separate legal entity from its officers, members and employees ([85]-[87]), and s 44 orders bind only the parties to the conference. The order was varied so that it bound the union "by" its officers, agents and employees ([98], [125]-[126], [141]).

In the decision's words: "The Act does not provide for any ban upon an organisation or its members engaging in a stop work meeting apart from when ordered by the Commission." ([75])

What it means for you

An order against industrial action binds the union, which acts through its officers and staff. It cannot bind members directly, but it can require the union to tell them about the order and direct them to comply.

$1,500 penaltyWestern Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Full Bench (Acting President Ritter, Chief Commissioner Beech, Senior Commissioner Smith) · 2 May 2008

A union executive decided to go ahead with a stop work meeting the Commission had banned

Two days after the Commission ordered the teachers' union to lift a directive for a stop work meeting, the union's executive met, considered the order, and decided the meeting would go ahead. The Registrar applied to the Full Bench to enforce the order.

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Result. Contravention proved (against the union): a penalty of $1,500 against a maximum of $2,000 at the time.

The union admitted it did not lift the directive, did not cancel the meeting and did not direct members to comply ([148]). Its executive had considered the order and decided the meeting would proceed ([149]).

The union pointed to its members' frustration with the bargaining and said the employer was not bargaining in good faith ([152]-[153]). A member of the Full Bench answered that the case was about the executive's decision to ignore an order, not the merits of the claims ([154]), that the union could have sought orders against the employer instead ([156]), and that it could have appealed the order: "To simply defy it was irresponsible" ([158]).

The union's undertaking to comply with future orders, its early admission, the absence of earlier enforcement proceedings and the short stoppage were weighed in mitigation ([162], [173]). All three members agreed on a penalty of $1,500, three quarters of the then maximum of $2,000 ([1], [166], [174]).

In the decision's words: "bargaining is not without rules. The Commission retains the power to decide whether particular industrial action should be permitted to occur, particularly having regard for the public interest." ([155])

What it means for you

Disagreeing with an order is a reason to appeal it, seek a stay or apply to vary it, not to ignore it. The maximum penalty is now $13,000 for each contravention, and each separately identifiable breach can be a separate contravention.

Order quashedWestern Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Full Bench (Acting President Le Miere, Chief Commissioner Beech, Commissioner Kenner) · 27 August 2010

Ten minutes to answer 132 pages was not a fair hearing

Education assistants had a half-day stoppage planned for the next morning. At an afternoon conference the employer produced written submissions and five witness statements the union had not seen, and the Commission allowed about ten minutes to read them before ordering that the action stop.

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Result. Appeal allowed (for the union) on two grounds: denial of procedural fairness, and an order that purported to bind members. The order was quashed.

The union and the employer were bargaining for a new education assistants' agreement ([2]). At a report-back conference the afternoon before a planned stoppage, the employer sought orders and handed up an outline of submissions and five witness statements ([6]-[7]). The union asked for an adjournment to review them and got about ten minutes ([8]). The order issued that evening, binding the union and its members ([11]).

The Full Bench held that fairness can be cut back for urgency only where the urgency is shown to require it ([35]-[37]). The documents ran to 132 pages, and ten minutes was not enough even to read them ([51]). It made no difference that the Commissioner said she would not rely on the witness statements, because the submissions summarised them ([51]). The evidence did not show that a longer adjournment would have defeated the purpose of the order ([53]-[55]).

The employer also conceded that the order could not bind members, because s 44(6a) limits an order to the parties to the conference ([65]-[66]). The Full Bench found that the appeal raised questions of public importance about fairness at s 44 conferences, and quashed the order ([68], [70]).

In the decision's words: "Procedural fairness is not to be limited because a power may need to be exercised urgently. It must be established that there was a need for urgent action in the circumstances of the particular case." ([35])

What it means for you

When an employer arrives at a conference with new material, ask for the time needed to read it and take instructions, and say why. An order made without that chance can be quashed.

$350,000 penalty orderedWestern Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Full Bench (Chief Commissioner Kenner, Commissioner Emmanuel, Commissioner Kucera) · 26 May 2023

A statewide nurses' strike in defiance of Commission orders led to an agreed $350,000 penalty

During bargaining for a public hospital nurses' agreement, the Commission ordered the union to defer a members' ballot, stop public statements about a better offer, and not strike. The union went ahead with all three, and paid strike subsidies to members.

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Result. Contraventions declared (against the union and its secretary): the union ordered to pay $350,000 to the State, the figure the parties agreed, by majority; the secretary ordered to pay $10,000 for failing to comply with a s 44 summons.

The employer applied for a s 44 conference to help negotiate a replacement agreement ([2]). After the union's secretary publicly called the employer's offer "divisive and inadequate" ([3]), the Senior Commissioner ordered the union to defer its ballot on the offer and not to make public statements that it was holding out for a better one ([6], [8]). A union appeal and stay application were later discontinued ([9]).

The ballot ran anyway, the statements continued, and the union's council resolved to ignore the orders ([10]). Further orders on 23 November 2022 required the union not to strike, to tell members about the order by email, website, Facebook and notice boards, and not to encourage the action, including by paying or offering to pay members who walked off the job ([15]). On 25 November 1,808 members walked off the job, and the union offered and later paid a strike subsidy (Annexure A, tables C and E; [176]).

The Registrar particularised thousands of contraventions, and the Full Bench held that each separately identifiable contravention attracts the maximum penalty, with the course of conduct and totality principles then applied ([142]-[145]). The conduct was "at the most extreme end" of seriousness ([157]), aggravated by the council's resolution to pay any fines and to keep paying strike subsidies ([163]).

The Chief Commissioner and Commissioner Kucera accepted the agreed penalty of $350,000, giving significant weight to the union's undertaking to comply with future orders ([62]-[63], [178], [256]). Commissioner Emmanuel would have imposed $480,000 ([184]). The secretary was ordered to pay $10,000 for failing to attend a conference when summoned ([178]).

In the decision's words: "It is clear from the former act alone, that the Council of the ANF saw the maximum penalty of $10,000 for a contravention of the Senior Commissioner's orders, as a cost of doing business." ([163])

What it means for you

Under s 84A every member walk-off, communication and payment that breaches an order can be a separate contravention. Resolving in advance to pay any fines, or funding the action, counts against the union.

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Worked examples

How it plays out, step by step.

Illustrative example, not a real case

Orders sought the afternoon before a stop work meeting

A union has called a two-hour stop work meeting of school support staff for 9 am tomorrow. At 3 pm the employer arrives at a report-back conference with an application for orders, a 40-page outline of submissions and four witness statements the union has not seen.

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  1. Ask for an adjournment long enough to read the material and take instructions, and say how long and why. Urgency limits a fair hearing only if it is shown to need that ([2010] WAIRC 00849 at [35]-[37], [51]-[55]).
  2. Argue for any order to be confined in time and form ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [140]), and object to any term that purports to bind members, who are not parties to the conference (s 44(6a); [2010] WAIRC 00849 at [65]-[66]).
  3. If an order is made, the union must comply, including any term requiring it to tell members about the order and direct them to comply. Defiance is enforced under s 84A ([2008] WAIRC 00270 at [158]).
  4. To change it: use liberty to apply, or appeal to the Full Bench within 21 days, explaining why the public interest requires an appeal from a finding, and seek a stay (s 49(2a), (3), (11); Commission Regulations reg 102(4)).

Illustrative example, not a real case.

Illustrative example, not a real case

A roster change announced without consultation

A council tells its outdoor crews on Monday that a new roster, with earlier starts, begins in a week. The industrial agreement requires consultation before major changes. The union wants the change held off.

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  1. Check the agreement's dispute settlement procedure, which every agreement must have, and take the steps it requires (s 48A). Check any no further claims clause too: seeking to hold the employer to the agreement is different from claiming something it does not provide ([2025] WAIRC 00146 at [89], [92]).
  2. File a Form 1B, marked urgent, seeking a compulsory conference and an interim order that the roster not be implemented until the conference has dealt with the dispute (s 44(6)(ba)(i); Commission Regulations reg 30).
  3. Frame the relief as what should happen from now on (consult, then decide). A bare declaration that the council breached the agreement is beyond a s 44 conference, and recovering any money owed is enforcement in the Industrial Magistrates Court ([2022] WAIRC 00763 at [3], [7]; [2025] WAIRC 00797 at [27]).
  4. If the conference does not resolve it, the Commission may arbitrate and make an order binding the parties (s 44(9)).

Illustrative example, not a real case.

Questions

The things people ask.

Do members need a ballot before taking industrial action in the WA system?

No. The IR Act has no ballot or notice requirement, and no protected action. It also gives no immunity: action can be stopped by Commission orders, and breaching an order is enforceable under s 84A ([2008] WAIRC 00364 at [75]).

Can a Commission order stop members, not just the union?

No. A s 44 order binds only the parties to the conference (s 44(6a)), and members are not parties. An order can require the union to tell members about it and direct them to comply ([2010] WAIRC 00849 at [65]-[66]; [2008] WAIRC 00364 at [98]).

The employer filed for orders this afternoon and the action is tomorrow. What can the union insist on?

A fair opportunity to answer. Urgency limits that only if it is shown to require it, and ten minutes to read 132 pages was not enough ([2010] WAIRC 00849 at [37], [51]).

We think the order is wrong. Do we have to obey it?

Yes, until it is varied, revoked or stayed. Use liberty to apply, or appeal within 21 days and seek a stay under s 49(11). Defying an order leads to s 84A proceedings ([2008] WAIRC 00270 at [158]).

What can the Full Bench do if the union breaches an order?

Accept an undertaking, caution, impose a penalty of up to $13,000 for each contravention, or direct a summons to show cause why the union's registration should not be cancelled or suspended (s 84A(5)).

Can members be docked pay for a stoppage?

The common law lets an employer refuse to pay for a period in which no service was given, and the Commission has applied that to employees who stopped work in circumstances with "an element of protest" ([1991] WAIRC 10490). Whether recovering pay already paid, or docking pay for partial bans, is a deduction needing authority under MCE Act s 17D has not been decided in WA. Check the award or agreement.

Can the Commission decide what an agreement clause means in a s 44 dispute?

Only as a step on the way to deciding what should happen in future. It cannot make a bare declaration of rights or enforce the agreement ([2025] WAIRC 00797 at [27]).

Can we appeal an interim order from a conference?

Only if the Full Bench thinks the matter so important that, in the public interest, an appeal should lie, because an interim order is usually a finding (s 49(2a)). Say why in the notice of appeal (reg 102(4)).

How long do we have to appeal a Full Bench decision?

21 days to the Industrial Appeal Court, on the three grounds in s 90(1) only. The Court cannot extend that time ([2009] WASCA 119 at [5]).